


Red & Black Prime Russia MBS Limited No.1



Transaction Structure







Note Structure

	Class A Notes	Class B Notes	Class C Notes
Rating (Moody's/Fitch)	A2/A	Baa2/BBB+	Ba2/BB+
Size (%)	84%	7%	9%
Size (\$ mm)	173,2	14,5	18,6
Subordination (%)	16.0	9.0	0.0
Coupon	LIBOR 1M + 105	LIBOR 1M + 145	LIBOR 1M + 335
Interest Convention %	Actual/360	Actual/360	Actual/360
Amortisation Type	Pass through	Pass through	Pass through
Expected WAL	3.1	5.3	5.3
Offered to investors	Yes	Yes	Yes
Legal Final Maturity Date	January 2035	January 2035	January 2035






Red & Black Highlights


- Market transaction for all Classes of notes
- EBRD participation in Class B and Class C
 - Provides implied preferred creditor treatment of structure
- First Russian ABS Class A without split rating
- Rating Agencies confirmed DCB servicing model of loans originated by third parties
- Transaction completed within planned timeframe







Red & Black Portfolio Characteristics















Red & Black Portfolio Characteristics









Comparison of Russian RMBS Transactions

	Offshore									Onshore							
	April 200	7	July 200)6	July 20	_	December 2006		June 2007		July 2007		November 2006		May 2007		
Characteristics/Bank	De Ita Cre d	dit	VTB	,		Dali		Gazprombank MBS		•		GPB Ipoteka		AHML			
Total ammount (USD)									-				-				
Rating/Tranch A	-/A2/A	172.0	-/A1/BBB+	74.0	-/Baa2/-	62.1	BBB+/A3/-	EUR 140,9	BBB+/A3/-	EUR 170	-/Baa2/BBB	159	-/Baa2/-	116,28	-/A3/-	112,4	
(S&P/Moody's/Fitch) Rating/Tranch B	-/AZ/A	173,2	-/A I/DDD+	74,2	-/Daaz/-	03, 1	DDD+/A3/-	RUR	DDD+/A3/-	RUR	-/Daaz/DDD	159	-/Daaz/-	110,20	-/A3/-	112,4	
(S&P/Moody's/Fitch)	-/Baa2/BBB+	14,5	- /Baa2/BBB	10.6	-/B1/-	6,3	BB/Baa3/-	518	BBB-/Baa3/-	312	-/Ba2/BB	16,2	-/-/-	_	-/Ba1/-	10,23	
Rating/Tranch C	-/ Daaz/ DDD+	14,3	/Daaz/DDD	10,0	701/-	0,3	DD/Daas/-	RUR	DDD-/Daas/-	RUR	-/ Daz/ DD	10,2	-/ -/ -	_	-/ Da I/-	10,23	
(S&P/Moody's/Fitch)	-/Ba2/BB+	18,6	-/B2/BB-	3,5	-/NR/-	3,1	B/Ba3/-	346	BB-/Ba2/-	329	NR	4,48	-/-/-	_	-/-/-	5,07	
Number of Mortgage		1.0,0	, , , , , ,	, 0,0	71111		2,240.	0.0				.,				0,01	
Loans			1 696,00		1 274,00		8 829,00		8 931,00		1 310,00		6 015,00		8 168,00		
Average Outstanding Loan Principal							,		,		,		·				
Balance (USD)	67 856,00		53 420,00		56 955,00		652 073,00 RUR		775 680,00 RUR		137 164,00		541 397,00 RUR		451 700,00 RUR		
Min Outstanding Loan																	
Principal Balance (USD) Max Outstanding Loan Principal) 12 029,00 g		3 599,00 2 305,00		00	100 634,00 RUR		100 789,00 RUR		6 976,00		NA		NA			
Balance (USD)			489 008,00		490 300,00		13 773 807,00 RUR		13 654 199,00 RUR		992 850,00		NA		NA		
Original ITN	,		70,35%		64,89%		67,38%		66,96%		71,17%		59,12%		57,80%		
Current LTV			65,39%		61,83%		66,45%		65,88%		67,29%		57,68%		53,40%		
Interest rate	11,43%		11,06%		11,39%		13,54%		13,22%		11,47%		13,84%		14,33%		
Seasoning (months) Original Term	10		12		10			6		6		10,26		9		24	
(months) Remaining Term	170		179 170			185		181		201		-		-			
(months)			168 160			177		172		191		189		182 SOCIETE			





Comparison of Russian RMBS Transactions – Pricing

Class/Bank	Red & Black	VTB	City Mortgage	Dali	Gazprobank MBS 2007-1	MCB	GPB Ipoteka	AHML
Class A	LIBOR+105	LIBOR+100	LIBOR+160	LIBOR+130	1mEuribor + 110 bp	1mLibor + 175 bp	7,22	7,12%
Class B	LIBOR+145	IFC	LIBOR+765	Fixed RUR	7,75%	1mLibor + 525 bp	N/A	9,5% (placed with EBRD)
Class C	LIBOR+335	retained	retained	Fixed RUR	10,75%	-	N/A	retained






Russian Securitization Market:


TO BE OR NOT TO BE?

Serge Ozerov
CFO, DeltaCredit Bank




Why couldn't it last? ⊗






Jan Fe Ma Apr Ma Jun Jul Au Se Oct No De

BUT



US 30-day Commercial Paper Yields, %




Sources: SG, Citibank, CBR, Moody's

*Includes Gazprom's \$1.5B future flow transaction

5 Oct 2007




The "Market Future" Puzzle






Securitization Value Chain- Investors






Rating Agencies & Transactions Costs



- Rating agencies
 - If we thought default probabilities were high for Russian deals, we ain't seen nothing yet!
 - ▶ Ratings "deflation" very likely
 - Is Russia "sub-prime", or are assets "sub-prime", or both?
- Will legal and other due diligence costs go up?




Issuers



- Warehousing will arrangers be prepared to take substantial risk during warehousing?
- Conduits could be a "dead duck" or a "white night" (hide Russia paper in a file of other securities)
- Multi-seller issuers will investors continue to accept transactions with heterogenous pools?




Servicing






Credit



- Let's get ready to be real:
 - ▶ "Confirmed" income does not mean there is a paper slip in the borrower's file; it means there is income in the person's bank account! (only one example)
- Does anyone in Russia know what a real credit due diligence looks like?
- By the way, is anyone tracking vintage delinquencies?








- How many originators segment their sales strategies Prime, Alt-A, Sub-Prime?
- How many know how to originate with an eye on investor demand & rating agencies?
- How many are able to continue origination without having access to securitization ..., i.e. how many repeat, benchmark issuers will there be?



Borrowers/State





- Are borrowers ready to borrow at higher rates resounding "YES"!
- Will the Russian state allow mortgage rates to go up during the election year.
- What happens if they don't will there be enough spread in the structure to earn high enough ratings and attract investors



Predictions

- Activity will differ by sector:
 - Future flows unaffected
 - Consumer credit strong (albeit slower) growth
 - Auto loans will depend on performance of international & Russian issuers over the next 12 months
 - ▶ RMBS 3-4 strongest issuers/servicers will become country platforms
- More differentiated pricing benchmark issuers will emerge in every sector
- Margins will widen, but not as much as other classes because Russian ABS margins have been wide to begin with (2 to 3 times more at comparable ratings levels corporate bonds)

